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Abstract
Unconditionally secure two-party bit commitment based solely on
the principles of quantum mechanics (without exploiting special rel-
ativistic signalling constraints, or principles of general relativity or
thermodynamics) has been shown to be impossible, but the claim
is repeatedly challenged. The quantum bit commitment theorem is
reviewed here and the central conceptual point, that an ‘Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen’ attack or cheating strategy can always be applied, is
clarified. The question of whether following such a cheating strategy
can ever be disadvantageous to the cheater is considered and answered
in the negative. There is, indeed, no loophole in the theorem.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Bz
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, the new fields of quantum information, quantum
computation, and quantum cryptology have emerged as the locus of foun-
dational research in quantum mechanics. In quantum cryptology, the main
results have been a variety of provably secure protocols for key distribu-
tion, following the original Bennett and Brassard (BB84) protocol [5], and
an important ‘no go’ theorem by Mayers [26, 27, 20]: the impossibility of
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unconditionally secure two-party bit commitment based solely on the princi-
ples of quantum mechanics (without exploiting special relativistic signalling
constraints, or principles of general relativity or thermodynamics). The quan-
tum bit commitment theorem generalizes previous results restricted to one-
way communication protocols by Mayers [25] and by Lo and Chau [19], and
applies to quantum, classical, and quantum-classical hybrid schemes (since
classical information is essentially quantum information subject to certain
constraints). The restriction to two-party schemes excludes schemes that in-
volve a trusted third-party or trusted channel properties, and the restriction
to schemes based solely on the principles of quantum mechanics excludes
schemes that exploit special relativistic signalling constraints (see below), or
schemes that might involve time machines or black holes.
In a key distribution protocol, the object is for two parties, Alice and Bob,
who initially share no information, to exchange information via quantum and
classical channels, so as to end up sharing a secret key (which they can then
use for encryption), in such a way as to ensure that any attempt by an
eavesdropper, Eve, to gain information about the secret key will be detected
with non-zero probability.
The features of quantum mechanics that allow secure key distribution
are, essentially, the quantum ‘no cloning’ theorem (which makes it impossi-
ble for Eve to copy quantum communications between Alice and Bob for later
analysis), and the fact that nonorthogonal quantum states cannot be distin-
guished without disturbing the states, so any information gain that depends
on distinguishing such states must introduce some detectable disturbance.
In a bit commitment protocol, one party, Alice, supplies an encoded bit
to a second party, Bob. The information available in the encoding should be
insufficient for Bob to ascertain the value of the bit, but sufficient, together
with further information supplied by Alice at a subsequent stage when she
is supposed to reveal the value of the bit, for Bob to be convinced that the
protocol does not allow Alice to cheat by encoding the bit in a way that
leaves her free to reveal either 0 or 1 at will.
To illustrate the idea, suppose Alice claims the ability to predict advances
or declines in the stock market on a daily basis. To substantiate her claim
without revealing valuable information (perhaps to a potential employer,
Bob) she suggests the following demonstration: She proposes to record her
prediction, before the market opens, by writing a 0 (for ‘decline’) or a 1
(for ‘advance’) on a piece of paper, which she will lock in a safe. The safe
will be handed to Bob, but Alice will keep the key. At the end of the day’s
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trading, she will announce the bit she chose and prove that she in fact made
the commitment at the earlier time by handing Bob the key. The question
is whether there exists a quantum analogue of this procedure that is uncon-
ditionally secure: provably secure by the laws of physics against cheating by
either Alice or Bob. Note that Bob can cheat if he can obtain some informa-
tion about Alice’s commitment before she reveals it (which would give him
an advantage in repetitions of the protocol with Alice). Alice can cheat if
she can delay actually making a commitment until the final stage when she
is required to reveal her commitment, or if she can change her commitment
at the final stage with a very low probability of detection.
The importance of quantum bit commitment as a cryptological primitive
arises because of its relation to other cryptological protocols. Lo [22] has
argued that the impossibility of unconditionally secure quantum bit com-
mitment implies the impossibility of secure quantum one-sided two-party
computations, and hence the impossibility of secure quantum one-out-of-two
oblivious transfer. It is easy to see that a remote coin tossing procedure, in
which neither party can cheat, would be possible if secure bit commitment
were possible, which would allow unconditionally secure remote gambling
(gambling over the internet, for example). But note that a procedure for
remote fair games has been proposed by Goldenberg, Vaidman, and Wies-
ner [13], so this is a weaker protocol than bit commitment.
Bennett and Brassard originally proposed a quantum bit commitment
protocol in [5]. The basic idea was to associate the 0 and 1 commitments
with two statistically equivalent quantum mechanical mixtures (represented
by the same density operator). As they showed in the same paper, Alice can
cheat by adopting an ‘Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen’ (EPR) attack or cheating
strategy: she prepares entangled pairs of particles, keeps one of each pair
(the ancilla) and sends the second particle (the channel particle) to Bob.
In this way she can fake sending one of two equivalent mixtures to Bob and
reveal either bit at will at the opening stage by effectively creating the desired
mixture via appropriate measurements on her ancillas. Bob cannot detect
this cheating strategy.
In a later paper [7], Brassard, Cre´peau, Josza, and Langlois proposed
a bit commitment protocol that they claimed to be unconditionally secure.
The BCJL scheme was first shown to be insecure by Mayers [24, 25]. Subse-
quently, Mayers [26, 27] and Lo and Chau [19] independently showed that a
large class of quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure. Lo and Chau
presented their result in [19] as applicable only to all proposed quantum bit
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commitment schemes, including the BCJL scheme (for which they relied on
Mayers’ extended analysis in [25]). But as Mayers showed in [26, 27], the
insight of Bennett and Brassard in [5] can be extended to a proof that a gen-
eralized version of the EPR cheating strategy can always be applied, if the
Hilbert space is enlarged in a suitable way by introducing additional ancilla
particles. Following Mayers, a similar result is proved in Lo and Chau [20],
where the operative assumption is that both Alice and Bob have available
quantum computers of unlimited power and are capable of storing quantum
signals indefinitely.
Mayers’ analysis in [27] explicitly models the exchange of quantum and
classical information in two-way quantum bit commitment protocols via a
‘direct’ approach. For an interesting ‘indirect’ or ‘reduction’ approach, see
[8, 9, 10]. Classical information can be understood as a type of quantum
information with additional constraints. The distinction between classical
and quantum information was always explicit in the analysis of proposed
quantum bit commitment protocols According to Mayers (personal commu-
nication), this explains why researchers failed to see the general impossibility
of quantum bit commitment, even after the basic mathematical result, which
is valid in a purely quantum world, was known.
The negative results of Mayers and Lo and Chau came as a surprise and
were received with dismay by the quantum cryptology community. The proof
of the basic theorem, which exploits the biorthogonal decomposition theo-
rem, is remarkably simple, but the impossibility of secure bit commitment
based solely on the principles of quantum (or classical) mechanics has pro-
found consequences. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that
the significance of the quantum bit commitment theorem is comparable to
Bell’s locality theorem [4] for quantum mechanics. Brassard and Fuchs have
speculated (private communication and [12]) that quantum mechanics can
be derived from two postulates about quantum information: the possibility
of secure key distribution and the impossibility of secure bit commitment.
That is, in a quantum world the communication of information is character-
ized precisely in this way in terms of a limited sort of privacy.
Perhaps because of the simplicity of the proof and the universality of the
claim, the quantum bit commitment theorem is continually challenged in the
literature (see, for example, [11, 28, 31]), on the basis that the proof does not
cover all possible procedures that might be exploited to implement quantum
bit commitment. There seems to be a general feeling that the theorem is
‘too good to be true’ and that there must be a loophole.
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In fact, there is no loophole. While Kent [16, 17] has shown how to im-
plement a secure classical bit commitment protocol by exploiting relativistic
signalling constraints in a timed sequence of communications between veri-
fiably separated sites for both Alice and Bob, and Hardy and Kent [14] and
Aharonov, Ta-Shma, Vazirani, and Yao [2] have investigated the security of
‘cheat-sensitive’ or ‘weak’ versions of quantum bit commitment, these results
are not in conflict with the quantum bit commitment theorem. In a bit com-
mitment protocol as usually construed, there is a time interval of arbitrary
length, where no information is exchanged, between the end of the commit-
ment stage of the protocol and the opening or unveiling stage, when Alice
reveals the value of the bit. Kent’s ingenious scheme effectively involves a
third stage between the commitment stage and the unveiling stage, in which
information is exchanged between Bob’s sites and Alice’s sites at regular in-
tervals until one of Alice’s sites chooses to unveil the originally committed
bit. At this moment of unveiling the protocol is not yet complete, because
a further sequence of unveilings is required between Alice’s sites and corre-
sponding sites of Bob before Bob has all the information required to verify
the commitment at a single site. If a bit commitment protocol is understood
to require an arbitrary amount of ‘free’ time between the end of the commit-
ment stage and the opening stage (in which no step is to be executed in the
protocol), then the quantum bit commitment theorem covers protocols that
exploit special relativistic signalling constraints. (I am indebted to Dominic
Mayers for clarifying this point.) The aim of the following discussion will be
to clarify the underlying logic of the proof, and especially the crucial signifi-
cance of the assumption that both parties can be assumed to have access to
quantum computers, so that a (generalized) EPR cheating strategy is always
possible.
In Section 2, I review the structure of the proof and show how any step in
a bit commitment protocol that requires Alice or Bob to make a determinate
choice (whether to perform one of a number of alternative measurements,
or whether to implement one of a number of alternative unitary transforma-
tions) can always be replaced by an EPR cheating strategy in the generalized
sense, assuming that Alice and Bob are both equipped with quantum com-
puters. That is, a classical disjunction over determinate possibilities—this
operation or that operation—can always be replaced by a quantum entan-
glement and a subsequent measurement (perhaps at a more convenient time
for the cheater) in which one of the possibilities becomes determinate. Es-
sentially, the classical disjunction is replaced by a quantum disjunction. This
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cheating strategy cannot be detected. Similarly, a measurement can be ‘held
at the quantum level’ without detection: instead of performing the measure-
ment and obtaining a determinate outcome as one of a number of possible
outcomes, a suitable unitary transformation can be performed on an enlarged
Hilbert space, in which the system is entangled with a ‘pointer’ ancilla in
an appropriate way, and the procedure of obtaining a determinate outcome
(which involves decoherence, or the ‘collapse’ of the quantum state onto an
eigenstate of the observable measured) can be delayed. The possibility of
keeping the series of transactions between Alice and Bob at the quantum
level by enlarging the Hilbert space, until the final exchange of classical in-
formation when Alice reveals her commitment, is the crucial insight that
underlies Mayers’ general proof. In John Smolin’s whimsical terminology,
this is the doctrine of the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space: the belief that
a fully quantum treatment can always be obtained by extending the Hilbert
space.
If it can be assumed that a measurement has in fact been performed and
a determinate outcome obtained, then secure bit commitment is possible.
This is tantamount to assuming that an EPR cheating strategy is blocked.
Since there is no way to distinguish whether the protocol has been followed
or replaced by an EPR cheating strategy, it would seem that there is no way
to ensure that a measurement has in fact been performed and a determinate
outcome recorded.
But how do we know that there is no bit commitment protocol of the
following sort: Suppose, at some stage of the protocol, Bob (say) is required
to perform one of two alternative measurements, X or Y, chosen at random.
If Bob actually chooses one of X or Y, and actually performs the measure-
ment and obtains a determinate outcome, then the protocol is secure against
cheating by both parties. If Bob implements an EPR strategy and keeps the
choice and the measurement at the quantum level, then it turns out that
Alice has a greater probability of cheating successfully than Bob. If there
were such a protocol, then even though Bob could implement an EPR strat-
egy without detection, he would effectively be forced to make the choice and
carry out the measurement, since he would not choose to put himself in a
weaker position relative to Alice over the long run in a series of bit commit-
ment transactions. In Section 3, I show that the possibility of such a protocol
is blocked by the theorem itself. That is, adopting an EPR cheating strategy
is never disadvantageous to the cheater.
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2 The Bit Commitment Theorem
Any bit commitment scheme will involve a series of transactions between
Alice and Bob, where a certain number, n, of quantum systems—the ‘chan-
nel particles’—are passed between them and subjected to various operations
(unitary transformations, measurements), possibly chosen randomly. I show
now how these operations can always be replaced, without detection, by en-
tangling a channel particle with one or more ancilla particles that function
as ‘pointer’ particles for measurements or ‘dice’ particles for random choices.
This is the (generalized) EPR cheating strategy.
Suppose, at a certain stage of a bit commitment protocol, that Bob is re-
quired to make a random choice between measuring one of two observables, X
or Y , on each channel particle he receives from Alice. For simplicity, assume
that X and Y each have two eigenvalues, x1, x2 and y1, y2. After record-
ing the outcome of the measurement, Bob is required to return the channel
particle to Alice. When Alice receives the i’th channel particle she sends
Bob the next channel particle in the sequence. We may suppose that the
measurement outcomes that Bob records form part of the information that
enables him to confirm Alice’s commitment, once she discloses it (together
with further information), so he is not required to report his measurement
outcomes to Alice until the final stage of the protocol when she reveals her
commitment.
Instead of following the protocol, Bob can construct a device that entan-
gles the input state |ψ〉C of a channel particle with the initial states, |d0〉B
and |p0〉B, of two ancilla particles that he introduces, the first of which func-
tions as a ‘quantum die’ for the random choice and the second as a ‘quantum
pointer’ for the measurement. It is assumed that Bob’s ability to construct
such a device—a special purpose quantum computer—is restricted only by
the laws of quantum mechanics. The entanglement is implemented by a
unitary transformation in the following way:1 Define two unitary transfor-
mations, UX and UY , that implement the X and Y measurements ‘at the
quantum level’ on the tensor product of the Hilbert space of the channel
1Note that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the channel particle is in a
pure state. If the channel particle is entangled with Alice’s ancillas, the device implements
the entanglement via the transformation I ⊗ · · ·, where I is the identity operator in the
Hilbert space of Alice’s ancillas.
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particle, HC , and the Hilbert space of Bob’s pointer ancilla, HB(P ):
|x1〉C |p0〉B UX−→ |x1〉C |p1〉B
|x2〉C |p0〉B UX−→ |x2〉C |p2〉B (1)
and
|y1〉C |p0〉B UY−→ |y1〉C |p1〉B
|y2〉C |p0〉B UY−→ |y2〉C |p2〉B (2)
so that
|ψ〉C|p0〉B UX−→ 〈x1|ψ〉|x1〉C |p1〉B + 〈x2|ψ〉|x2〉C |p2〉B (3)
and
|ψ〉C|p0〉B UY−→ 〈y1|ψ〉|y1〉C |p1〉B + 〈y2|ψ〉|y2〉C|p2〉B (4)
The random choice is defined similarly by a unitary transformation V on
the tensor product of the Hilbert space of Bob’s die ancilla, HB(D), and the
Hilbert space HC ⊗HB(P ). Suppose |dX〉 and |dY 〉 are two orthogonal states
in HB(D) and that |d0〉 = 1√2 |dX〉 + 1√2 |dY 〉. Then (suppressing the obvious
subscripts) V is defined by:
|dX〉 ⊗ |ψ〉|p0〉 V−→ |dX〉 ⊗ UX |ψ〉|p0〉
|dY 〉 ⊗ |ψ〉|p0〉 V−→ |dY 〉 ⊗ UY |ψ〉|p0〉 (5)
so that
|d0〉 ⊗ |ψ〉|p0〉 V−→
1√
2
|dX〉 ⊗ UX |ψ〉|p0〉+ 1√
2
|dY 〉 ⊗ UY |ψ〉|p0〉 (6)
where the tensor product symbol has been introduced selectively to indicate
that Ux and Uy are defined on HC ⊗HB(P ).
If Bob were to actually choose the observable X or Y randomly, and
actually perform the measurement and obtain a particular eigenvalue, Alice’s
density operator for the channel particle would be:
1
2
(|〈x1|ψ〉|2|x1〉〈x1|+ |〈x2|ψ〉|2|x2〉〈x2|)
1
2
(|〈y1|ψ〉|2|y1〉〈y1|+ |〈y2|ψ〉|2|y2〉〈y2|) (7)
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assuming that Alice does not know what observable Bob chose to measure,
nor what outcome he obtained. But this is precisely the same density oper-
ator generated by tracing over Bob’s ancilla particles for the state produced
in (6). In other words, the density operator for the channel particle is the
same for Alice, whether Bob randomly chooses which observable to measure
and actually performs the measurement, or whether he implements an EPR
cheating strategy with his two ancillas that produces the transition (6) on
the enlarged Hilbert space.
If Bob is required to eventually report what measurement he performed
and what outcome he obtained, he can at that stage measure the die ancilla
for the eigenstate |dX〉 or |dY 〉, and then measure the pointer ancilla for
the eigenstate |p1〉 or |p2〉. In effect, if we consider the ensemble of possible
outcomes for the two measurements, Bob will have converted the ‘improper’
mixture generated by tracing over his ancillas to a ‘proper’ mixture. But
the difference between a proper and improper mixture is undetectable by
Alice since she has no access to Bob’s ancillas, and it is only by measuring
the composite system consisting of the channel particle together with Bob’s
ancillas that Alice could ascertain that the channel particle is entangled with
the ancillas.
In fact, if it were possible to distinguish between a proper and improper
mixture, it would be possible to signal superluminally: Alice could know
instantaneously whether or not Bob performed a measurement on his ancillas
by monitoring the channel particles in her possession. Note that it makes no
difference whether Bob or Alice measures first, since the measurements are
of observables in different Hilbert spaces, which therefore commute.
Clearly, a similar argument applies if Bob is required to choose between
alternative unitary operations at some stage of a bit commitment protocol.
Perhaps less obviously, an EPR cheating strategy is also possible if Bob is
required to perform a measurement or choose between alternative operations
on channel particle i+1, conditional on the outcome of a prior measurement
on channel particle i, or conditional on a prior choice of some operation from
among a set of alternative operations. Of course, if Bob is in possession of all
the channel particles at the same time, he can perform an entanglement with
ancillas on the entire sequence, considered as a single composite system.
But even if Bob only has access to one channel particle at a time (which
he is required to return to Alice after performing a measurement or other
operation before she sends him the next channel particle), he can always
entangle channel particle i+ 1 with the ancillas he used to entangle channel
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particle i.
For example, suppose Bob is presented with two channel particles in se-
quence. He is supposed to decide randomly whether to measure X or Y on
the first particle, perform the measurement, and return the particle to Alice.
After Alice receives the first particle, she sends Bob the second particle. If
Bob measured X on the first particle and obtained the outcome x1, he is
supposed to measure X on the second particle; if he obtained the outcome
x2, he is supposed to measure Y on the second particle. If he measured Y on
the first particle and obtained the outcome y1, he is supposed to apply the
unitary transformation U1 to the second particle; if he obtained the outcome
y2, he is supposed to apply the unitary transformation U2. After performing
the required operation, he is supposed to return the second particle to Alice.
It would seem at first sight that Bob has to actually perform a measure-
ment on the first channel particle and obtain a particular outcome before he
can apply the protocol to the second particle, given that he only has access
to one channel particle at a time, so an EPR cheating strategy is excluded.
But this is not so. Bob’s strategy is the following: He applies the EPR strat-
egy discussed above for two alternative measurements to the first channel
particle. For the second channel particle, he applies the following unitary
transformation on the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of his ancillas
and the channel particle, where the state of the second channel particle is
denoted by |φ〉, and the state of the pointer ancilla for the second channel
particle is denoted by |q0〉 (a second die particle is not required):
|dX〉|p1〉|φ〉|q0〉 UC−→ |dX〉|p1〉 ⊗ UX |φ〉|q0〉
|dX〉|p2〉|φ〉|q0〉 UC−→ |dX〉|p2〉 ⊗ UY |φ〉|q0〉
|dY 〉|p1〉|φ〉|q0〉 UC−→ |dY 〉|p1〉 ⊗ U1|φ〉 ⊗ |q0〉
|dY 〉|p2〉|φ〉|q0〉 UC−→ |dY 〉|p2〉 ⊗ U2|φ〉 ⊗ |q0〉 (8)
Since an EPR cheating strategy can always be applied without detection,
the proof of the bit commitment theorem assumes that at the end of the
commitment stage the composite system consisting of Alice’s ancillas, the n
channel particles, and Bob’s ancillas will be represented by some composite
entangled state |0〉 or |1〉, depending on Alice’s commitment, on a Hilbert
space HA ⊗ HB, where HA is the Hilbert space of the particles in Alice’s
possession at that stage (Alice’s ancillas and the channel particles retained by
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Alice, if any), and HB is the Hilbert space of the particles in Bob’s possession
at that stage (Bob’s ancillas and the channel particles retained by Bob, if
any).
Now, the density operators WB(0) and WB(1) characterizing the infor-
mation available to Bob for the two alternative commitments are obtained
by tracing the states |0〉 and |1〉 over HA. If these density operators are the
same, then Bob will be unable to distinguish the 0-commitment from the
1-commitment without further information from Alice. In this case, the pro-
tocol is said to be ‘concealing.’ What the proof establishes, by an application
of the biorthogonal decomposition theorem, is that if WB(0) = WB(1) then
there exists a unitary transformation in HA that will transform |0〉 to |1〉.
That is, if the protocol is ‘concealing’ then it cannot be ‘binding’ on Alice:
she can always make the 0-commitment and follow the protocol (with ap-
propriate applications of an EPR strategy) to establish the state |0〉. At the
final stage when she is required to reveal her commitment, she can change
her commitment if she chooses, depending on circumstances, by applying a
suitable unitary transformation in her own Hilbert space to transform |0〉 to
|1〉 without Bob being able to detect this move. So either Bob can cheat
by obtaining some information about Alice’s choice before she reveals her
commitment, or Alice can cheat.
The essentials of the proof can be sketched as follows: In the biorthogonal
(Schmidt) decomposition, the states |0〉 and |1〉 can be expressed as:
|0〉 = ∑
i
√
ci|ai〉|bi〉
|1〉 = ∑
j
√
c′j|a′j〉|b′j〉 (9)
where {|ai〉}, {|a′j〉} are two orthonormal sets of states inHA, and {|bi〉}, {|b′j〉}
are two orthonormal sets in HB.
The density operators WB(0) and WB(1) are defined by:
WB(0) = TrA|0〉〈0| =
∑
i
ci|bi〉〈bi|
WB(1) = TrA|1〉〈1| =
∑
j
c′j|b′j〉〈b′j| (10)
Bob can’t cheat if and only if WB(0) = WB(1). Now, by the spectral
theorem, the decompositions:
WB(0) =
∑
i
ci|bi〉〈bi|
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WB(1) =
∑
j
c′j|b′j〉〈b′j |
are unique. For the nondegenerate case, where the ci are all distinct and the
c′j are all distinct, the condition WB(0) = WB(1) implies that for all k:
ck = c
′
k
|bk〉 = |b′k〉 (11)
and so
|0〉 = ∑
k
√
ck|ak〉|bk〉
|1〉 = ∑
k
√
ck|a′k〉|bk〉 (12)
It follows that there exists a unitary transformation U ∈ HA such that
{|ak〉} U−→ {|a′k〉} (13)
and hence
|0〉 U−→ |1〉 (14)
The degenerate case can be handled in a similar way. Suppose that c1 =
c2 = c
′
1 = c
′
2 = c. Then |b1〉, |b2〉 and |b′1〉, |b′2〉 span the same subspace H in
HB, and hence (assuming the coefficients are distinct for k > 2:
|0〉 = √c(|a1〉|b1〉+ |a2〉|b2〉) +
∑
k>2
√
ck|ak〉|bk〉
|1〉 = √c(|a′1〉|b′1〉+ |a′2〉|b′2〉) +
∑
k>2
√
ck|a′k〉|bk〉
=
√
c(|a′′1〉|b1〉+ |a′′2〉|b2〉+
∑
k>2
√
ck|a′k〉|bk〉 (15)
where |a′′1〉, |a′′2〉 are orthonormal states spanningH. Since {|a′′1〉, |a′′2〉, |a3〉, . . .}
is an orthonormal set inHA, there exists a unitary transformation in HA that
transforms {|ak〉} to {|a′′1〉, |a′′2〉, |a′3〉, . . .}, and hence |0〉 to |1〉
The extension of the theorem to the nonideal case, where WB(0) ≈
WB(1), so that there is a small probability of Bob distinguishing the alterna-
tive commitments, shows that Alice has a correspondingly large probability
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of cheating successfully: there exists a U that will transform WB(0) suffi-
ciently close to WB(1) so that Bob has a very small probability of making
the distinction.
The heart of the mathematical proof is the biorthogonal decomposition
theorem. But the essential conceptual insight is the possibility of enlarging
the Hilbert space and implementing an EPR strategy without detection.
This raises the following question, considered in the next section: Suppose
Bob cannot cheat because WB(0) = WB(1), so by the theorem there exists
a unitary transformation U in HA that will transform |0〉 to |1〉. Could
there be a protocol in which Alice also cannot cheat because, although there
exists a suitable unitary transformation U , she cannot know what unitary
transformation to apply? In the next section we shall see that this is indeed
the case, but only if U depends on Bob’s operations, which are unknown to
Alice. But then Bob would have to actually make a determinate choice or
obtain a determinate outcome in a measurement, and he could always avoid
doing so without detection by applying an EPR strategy. The remaining
question would seem to be whether he might choose to avoid an EPR strategy
in a certain situation because it would be disadvantageous to him. How do
we know that following an EPR strategy is never disadvantageous?
3 A Possible Loophole?
The question at issue in this section is whether applying an EPR cheating
strategy can ever be disadvantageous to the cheater. Note that the standard
approach in cryptology is to consider the possibility of cheating against an
honest opponent. Here we are considering the question of whether a quantum
bit commitment protocol exists with the feature that one of the parties would
forego a certain cheating strategy, because the opposing party would be able
to cheat by taking advantage of such a move. So, strictly speaking, this
would not be considered a loophole in the quantum bit commitment theorem,
even if we could identify such a protocol. Nevertheless, this ‘game-theoretic’
extension of the usual notion is certainly relevant to the issue of security.
To focus the question, it will be worthwhile to consider a particular pro-
tocol based on the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz notion of pre- and post-
selected quantum states [1]. If (i) Alice prepares a system in a certain state
|pre〉 at time t1, (ii) Bob measures some observable Q on the system at time
t2, and (iii) Alice measures an observable of which |post〉 is an eigenstate at
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time t3, and post-selects for |post〉, then Alice can assign probabilities to the
outcomes of Bob’s Q-measurement at t2, conditional on the states |pre〉 and
|post〉 at times t1 and t3, respectively, as follows:
prob(qk) =
|〈pre|Pk|post〉|2∑
i |〈pre|Pi|post〉|2
(16)
where Pi is the projection operator onto the i’th eigenspace of Q. Notice
that the ABL-rule is time-symmetric, in the sense that the states |pre〉 and
|post〉 can be interchanged, so these states are sometimes referred to as time-
symmetric states.
If Q is unknown to Alice, she can use this ‘ABL-rule’ to assign proba-
bilities to the outcomes of various hypothetical Q-measurements. The in-
teresting peculiarity of the ABL-rule, by contrast with the usual Born rule
for pre-selected states, is that it is possible—for an appropriate choice of ob-
servables Q, Q′, . . . , and states |pre〉 and |post〉—to assign unit probability
to the outcomes of a set of mutually noncommuting observables. That is,
Alice can be in a position to assert a conjunction of conditional statements
of the form: ‘If Bob measured Q, then the outcome must have been qi, with
certainty, and if Bob measured Q′, then the outcome must have been q′j , with
certainty, . . . ,’ where Q,Q′, . . . are mutually noncommuting observables.
A case of this sort has been discussed by Vaidman, Aharonov, and Al-
bert [30], where the outcome of a measurement of any of the three spin
components σx, σy, σz of a spin-
1
2
particle can be inferred from an appropri-
ate pre- and post-selection. Alice prepares a pair of particles, A and C, in
the Bell state:
|pre〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑z〉A| ↑z〉C + | ↓z〉A| ↓z〉C (17)
where | ↑z〉 and | ↓z〉 denote the σz-eigenstates. Alice sends the channel
particle C to Bob and keeps the ancilla A. Bob measures either σx, or σy,
or σz on the channel particle and returns the channel particle to Alice. Alice
then measures an observable R on the pair of particles, where R has the
eigenstates:
|r1〉 = 1√
2
| ↑z〉| ↑z〉+ 1
2
(| ↑z〉| ↓z〉eipi/4 + | ↓z〉| ↑z〉e−ipi/4) (18)
|r2〉 = 1√
2
| ↑z〉| ↑z〉 − 1
2
(| ↑z〉| ↓z〉eipi/4 + | ↓z〉| ↑z〉e−ipi/4) (19)
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|r3〉 = 1√
2
| ↓z〉| ↓z〉+ 1
2
(| ↑z〉| ↓z〉e−ipi/4 + | ↓z〉| ↑z〉eipi/4) (20)
|r4〉 = 1√
2
| ↓z〉| ↓z〉 − 1
2
(| ↑z〉| ↓z〉e−ipi/4 + | ↓z〉| ↑z〉eipi/4) (21)
Note that:
|pre〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑z〉| ↑z〉+ | ↓z〉| ↓z〉 (22)
=
1√
2
(| ↑x〉| ↑x〉+ | ↓x〉| ↓x〉 (23)
=
1√
2
(| ↑y〉| ↓y〉+ | ↓y〉| ↑y〉 (24)
=
1
2
(|r1〉+ |r2〉+ |r3〉+ |r4〉) (25)
Alice can now assign values to the outcomes of Bob’s spin measurements
via the ABL-rule, whether Bob measured σx, σy, or σz, based on the post-
selections |r1〉, |r2〉, |r3〉, or |r4〉, according to Table 1.
σx σy σz
r1 ↑ ↑ ↑
r2 ↓ ↓ ↑
r3 ↑ ↓ ↓
r4 ↓ ↑ ↓
Table 1: σx, σy, σz measurement outcomes correlated with eigenvalues of R
Consider, now, the following protocol for bit commitment based on the
Vaidman-Aharonov-Albert case. Alice prepares n copies of the Bell state
|pre〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑z〉A| ↑z〉C + | ↓z〉A| ↓z〉C . She keeps the ancillas and sends
the channel particles to Bob in sequence. Bob measures either σx, σy, or
σz chosen randomly on a channel particle, records the outcome, and returns
the particle to Alice before she sends him the next channel particle in the
sequence. Alice measures the observable R on each channel particle she
receives back from Bob.
The commitment is made as follows: After the sequence of measurements,
Bob announces the indices in the sequence for which he obtained a ‘↑’ out-
come for his measurements (without announcing whether he measured σx,
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σy, or σz). The remaining elements in the sequence are discarded. Alice
can now divide the ↑-sequence into two subsequences of approximately equal
length (for large n): the subsequence S1 for which she obtained the outcome
r1 for R, and the complementary subsequence S234 for which she obtained
the outcome r2, r3, or r4. If Alice commits to 0, she announces the indices of
the subsequence S234 and proves her commitment at the final stage, when she
reveals her commitment, by her ability to announce (from Table 1), for each
element in the subsequence, the observable that Bob measured, either σx, σy,
or σz. If she commits to 1, she announces the indices of the subsequence S1
and proves her commitment by her ability to announce, for each element in
the complementary subsequence S234, the observable that Bob measured.
At first sight, it might appear that this protocol is not of the sort covered
by the bit commitment theorem. To see that it is, suppose that instead of
following the protocol and actually choosing one of σx, σy, or σz, performing
the measurement, and obtaining a determinate outcome, Bob implements
an EPR cheating strategy with a quantum die ancilla with three orthogonal
states |dx〉, |dy〉, |dz〉 corresponding to the choice of spin observable σx, σy,
σz. Then the state of the composite system consisting of Alice’s ancilla, the
channel particle, and Bob’s die and pointer ancillas is:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
3
|dx〉B( 1√
2
| ↑x〉A| ↑x〉C|p↑〉B + 1√
2
| ↓x〉A| ↓x〉C|p↓〉B)
+
1√
3
|dy〉B( 1√
2
| ↑y〉A| ↓y〉C |p↓〉B + 1√
2
| ↓y〉A| ↑y〉C |p↑〉B)
+
1√
3
|dz〉B( 1√
2
| ↑z〉A| ↑z〉C |p↑〉B + 1√
2
| ↓z〉A| ↓z〉C |p↓〉B) (26)
To announce ‘↑,’ Bob measures the pointer ancilla for p↑ or p↓, which
projects |Ψ〉 onto:
| ↑〉 = |p↑〉B 1√
3
(|dx〉B| ↑x〉A| ↑x〉C + |dy〉B| ↓y〉A| ↑y〉C + |dz〉B| ↑z〉A| ↑z〉C)
(27)
or
| ↓〉 = |p↓〉B 1√
3
(|dx〉B| ↓x〉A| ↓x〉C + |dy〉B| ↑y〉A| ↓y〉C + |dz〉B| ↓z〉A| ↓z〉C)
(28)
with probability 1
2
. Note that this enables Bob to announce the ‘↑’ out-
comes without actually measuring σx, σy, or σz! In effect, he has a quantum
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computer that computes ‘↑’ or ‘↓’ for the quantum disjunction ‘σx or σy or
σz.’
The state | ↑〉 can be expressed in terms of R-eigenstates:
| ↑〉 = 1√
3
(
1√
2
|r1〉A + 1√
2
|r3〉A)|dx〉B|p↑〉B
+
1√
3
(
1√
2
|r1〉A + 1√
2
|r4〉A)|dy〉B|p↑〉B
+
1√
3
(
1√
2
|r1〉A + 1√
2
|r2〉A)|dz〉B|p↑〉B (29)
and rewritten as:
| ↑〉 = 1√
2
|r1〉A( 1√
3
|dx〉B + 1√
3
|dy〉B + 1√
3
|dz〉B)|p↑〉B
+
1√
2
(
1√
3
|r3〉A|dx〉B + 1√
3
|r4〉A|dy〉B + 1√
3
|r2〉A|dz〉B)|p↑〉 (30)
Evidently, after Alice measures the observable R on the channel particles
in the ‘↑’ subsequence and announces either the subsequence S234 for which
she obtained the eigenvalues r2, r3, or r4 corresponding to the 0-commitment,
or the subsequence S1 for which she obtained the eigenvalue r1 correspond-
ing to the 1-commitment, Bob’s density operator for the channel particles
(obtained by tracing over Alice’s ancillas and Bob’s ancillas) will be either:
WB(0) =
1
3
(|dx〉BB〈dx|+ |dy〉BB〈dy|+ |dz〉BB〈dz|) (31)
for the subsequence S234, or:
WB(1) =
1
3
(|dx〉B + |dy〉B + |dz〉B)(B〈dx|+ B〈dy|+ B〈dz|) (32)
for the subsequence S1. (More precisely, these are the density operators for
a single channel particle. The density operator for the sequence of channel
particles is in each case a tensor product of the relevant operator over the
elements of the sequence.) But these density operators are distinguishable:
W0 is the density operator of an equal weight mixture of pure states |dx〉B,
|dy〉B, and |dz〉B, while W1 is the density operator of the pure state 1√3 |dx〉B+
1√
3
|dy〉B + 1√3 |dz〉B. So Bob can cheat—the protocol is insecure.
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Now, suppose we assume that Bob is forced to make a determinate choice
of which spin component observable to measure for each channel particle,
and actually perform the measurements and record the outcomes. Then it is
clear that both subsequences S1 and S234 will be characterized by the same
equal weight mixture of pure states |dx〉B, |dy〉B, and |dz〉B. So Bob cannot
cheat. But Alice cannot cheat either. Of course, by the bit commitment the-
orem, since Alice is in possession of all the channel particles at the final stage
when she is required to reveal her commitment, there exists a unitary trans-
formation in Alice’s Hilbert space (which now includes the channel particles)
that will transform the states of the ancilla-channel pairs to R-eigenstates
that conform to Bob’s measurement outcomes. But this unitary transforma-
tion depends on the outcomes of Bob’s measurements, which are unknown
to Alice. Essentially, Alice would have to transform the state |r1〉 for each
element in the declared subsequence or the complementary subsequence to
the state |r2〉, |r3〉, or |r4〉, corresponding to Bob’s measurement outcome
for that element, in order to successfully change her commitment without
Bob being able to detect her cheating. There exists a unitary transformation
that Alice can implement to achieve this result, but she cannot know what
unitary transformation to employ. So the protocol is secure, subject to the
assumption that Bob cannot apply an EPR cheating strategy.
The question raised at the beginning of this section can now be put more
concretely. In the above protocol, if Bob is honest and does not apply an EPR
strategy, then neither party can cheat. If he applies the strategy, then he
gains the advantage. Can there be a bit commitment protocol that is similar
to the above protocol, except that the application of an EPR strategy by Bob
at a certain stage of the protocol would give Alice the advantage, rather than
Bob, while conforming to the protocol would ensure that neither party could
cheat? If there were such a protocol, then Bob would, in effect, be forced
to conform to the protocol and avoid the EPR strategy, and unconditionally
secure bit commitment would be possible.
In fact, the impossibility of such a protocol follows from the theorem itself.
Suppose there were such a protocol. That is, suppose that if Bob applies an
EPR strategy then WB(0) = WB(1), so by the theorem there exists a unitary
transformation U in Alice’s Hilbert space that will transform |0〉 to |1〉. Alice
must know this U because it is uniquely determined by Bob’s deviation from
the protocol according to an EPR strategy that keeps all disjunctions at the
quantum level as linear superpositions. Suppose also that if, instead, Bob is
honest and follows the protocol (so that there is a determinate choice for every
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disjunction over possible operations or possible measurement outcomes), then
WB(0) =WB(1), but the unitary transformation in Alice’s Hilbert space that
allows her to transform |0〉 to |1〉 depends on Bob’s choices or measurement
outcomes, which are unknown to Alice.
Now the crucial point to note is that the information available in Al-
ice’s Hilbert space must be the same whether Bob follows the protocol and
makes determinate choices and obtains determinate measurement outcomes
before Alice applies the unitary transformation U that transforms |0〉 to |1〉,
or whether he deviates from the protocol via an EPR strategy in which he
implements corresponding entanglements with his ancillas to keep choices
and measurement outcomes at the quantum level before Alice applies the
transformation U , and only makes these choices and measurement outcomes
determinate at the final stage of the protocol by measuring his ancillas. There
can be no difference for Alice because Bob’s measurements on his ancillas and
any measurements or operations that Alice might perform take place in dif-
ferent Hilbert spaces, so the operations commute. If Alice’s density operator
(obtained by tracing over Bob’s ancillas), which characterizes the statistics
of measurements that Alice can perform in her part of the universe, were
different depending on whether or not Bob actually carried out the required
measurements, as opposed to keeping the alternatives at the quantum level
by implementing corresponding entanglements with ancillas, then it would be
possible to use this difference to signal superluminally. Actual measurements
by Bob on his ancillas that selected alternatives in the entanglements as de-
terminate would instantaneously alter the information available in Alice’s
part of the universe.
It follows that in the hypothetical bit commitment protocol we are consid-
ering, the unitary transformation U in Alice’s Hilbert space that transforms
|0〉 to |1〉 must be the same transformation in the honest scenario as in the
cheating scenario. But we are assuming that the transformation in the honest
scenario is unknown to Alice and depends on Bob’s measurement outcomes,
while the transformation in the cheating scenario is unique and known to
Alice. So there can be no such protocol: the deviation from the protocol by
an EPR strategy can never place Bob in a worse position than following the
protocol honestly.
The argument can be put formally in terms of the theorem as follows:
The cheating scenario produces one of two alternative pure states |0〉c or |1〉c
in HA⊗HB (‘c’ for ‘cheating strategy). Since the reduced density operators
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in HB:
W
(c)
B (0) = TrA|0〉cc〈0|
W
(c)
B (1) = TrA|1〉cc〈1| (33)
are required by assumption to be the same:
W
(c)
B (0) =W
(c)
B (1) (34)
the states |0〉c and |1〉c can be expressed in biorthogonal decomposition as:
|0〉c =
∑
i
√
ci|ai〉|bi〉
|1〉c =
∑
i
√
ci|a′i〉|bi〉 (35)
where the reduced density operators in HA:
W
(c)
A (0) = TrB|0〉cc〈0| =
∑
i
|ci|ai〉〈ai|
W
(c)
A (1) = TrB|1〉cc〈1| =
∑
i
|ci|a′i〉〈a′i| (36)
are different:
W
(c)
A (0) 6=W (c)A (1) (37)
It follows that there exists a unitary operator Uc ∈ HA defined by the
spectral representations of W
(c)
A (0) and W
(c)
A (1):
{|ai〉} Uc−→ {|a′i〉} (38)
such that:
|0〉c Uc−→ |1〉c (39)
The honest scenario produces one of two alternative pure states |0〉h and
|1〉h inHA⊗HB (‘h’ for ‘honest scenario’), where the pair {|0〉h, |1〉h} depends
on Bob’s choices and the outcomes of his measurements.
By assumption, as in the cheating scenario, the reduced density operators
W
(h)
B (0) and W
(h)
B (1) in HB are the same:
W
(h)
B (0) =W
(h)
B (1) (40)
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which entails the existence of a unitary operator Uh ∈ HA such that:
|0〉h Uh−→ |1〉h (41)
where Uh depends on Bob’s choices and measurement outcomes.
Now, the difference between the honest scenario and the cheating scenario
is undetectable in HA, which means that the reduced density operators in
HA are the same in the honest scenario as in the cheating scenario:
W
(h)
A (0) = W
(c)
A (0)
W
(h)
A (1) = W
(c)
A (1) (42)
Since Uh is defined by the spectral representations of W
(h)
A (0) and W
(h)
A (1),
it follows that Uh = Uc. But we are assuming that Uh depends on Bob’s
choices and measurement outcomes, while Uc is uniquely defined by Bob’s
EPR strategy, in which there are no determinate choices or measurement
outcomes. Conclusion: there can be no bit commitment protocol in which
neither Alice nor Bob can cheat if Bob honestly follows the protocol, but
Alice can cheat if Bob deviates from the protocol via an EPR strategy. If
neither Bob nor Alice can cheat in the honest scenario, then Bob and not
Alice must be able to cheat in the cheating scenario.
A similar argument rules out a protocol in which neither party can cheat if
Bob is honest (as above), but if Bob follows an EPR strategy, then WB(0) ≈
WB(1), so Bob has some probability of cheating successfully, but Alice has
a greater probability of cheating successfully than Bob. Again, the unitary
transformation Uc that would allow Alice to cheat with a certain probability
of success if Bob followed an EPR strategy would also have to allow Alice
to cheat successfully if Bob were honest. But the supposition is that Alice
cannot cheat if Bob is honest, because the unitary transformation Uh in
that case depends on Bob’s choices and measurement outcomes, which are
unknown to Alice. It follows that there can be no such protocol.
So there is no loophole – not even in the extended sense: following an
EPR cheating strategy can never be disadvantageous to the cheater. Un-
conditionally secure quantum bit commitment (in the sense of the theorem)
really is impossible.
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